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Abstract	
 
Different approaches have been used to test capital structure theories empirically. In this paper 
the statement that Myers and Majluf (1984) discussed, that a low risk debt issue should affect the 
firm value less than a high risk equity issue, is explored and tested by applying an event study 
approach similar to the one Eckbo (1986) carried out on different kinds of debt issuances. There 
are also some important assumptions are tested for comparable reasons. A sample of all firms on 
the NYSE from the period January, 1 in 2007 to December, 31 in 2012 is used. The findings are 
that the Pecking Order Theory holds rather well when looking at a two-day event window from 
issuance announcements of debt and equity. The Traditional Trade-off Theory also holds, but 
only under the fairly rough assumption that specific firms have very different capital structure 
value adding-optima. Interestingly, it is found that the market reaction effect of an announcement 
is delayed by one day and only visible on the day after the announcement.	
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1.	Introduction	 	
1.1	Background	
Ever since the 1950s, when Modigliani and Miller (1958) published their groundbreaking paper 
on a perfect market with no frictions, academics still argue about the effects that capital structure 
has on a firm's value. The main problem with the original Modigliani-Miller (MM) framework is 
that it assumes several unrealistic assumptions hold, such as a friction free and perfect market. 
This has led to other theories evolving and opposing the conclusions that are reached when 
applying the MM framework, theories such as the Pecking Order Theory and the Traditional 
Trade-off Theory. 
The Pecking Order Theory, as is put forth by Myers and Majluf (1984), is based on asymmetric 
information. Basically, managers will try to exploit their advantage of better information to try 
and maximize their position when it comes to capital structure. The Traditional Trade-off 
Theory, as Frank and Goyal (2007) explain, is a trade-off between the tax benefit from each 
additional dollar of debt, and the cost of bankruptcy that additional dollar carries. 
According to Myers and Majluf (1984) the Pecking Order Theory would affect the capital 
structure and financing decisions in several ways. One of these ways would be that the value of a 
firm should fall after a decision to issue equity, while a risk-free debt issuance would have no 
effect on stock value. In practice, a debt issuance is seldom completely risk free, but generally 
assumed less risky than an equity issue. 
There are many possible ways to measure the value change of a firm due to an issuing event. The 
event study approach is generally used to calculate abnormal returns of firms, which indicates a 
change in the market value of a firm (Brown & Warner, 1985). By using this approach, it should 
then be possible to compare the market and valuing effects of a debt and equity issuance 
announcement, under the assumption that the kinds of firms that are issuing debt and equity are 
somewhat similar. 
Eckbo (1986) uses the event study approach to estimate the abnormal return effects, from a debt 
issuing announcement, which included signaling effects. A similar framework could be applied 
to make a comparative study between equity and debt issuing announcements. 
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1.2	Problematisation	
The problem is that there are two opposing views, the original, frictionless MM view, and the 
views that stem from both the Pecking Order and Traditional Trade-off Theories. Both theories 
exploit a very different, but nonetheless, very real aspect of the market that the MM framework 
assumes is not there. This makes it unclear as to whether changes in capital structure actually 
affect the value of the firm. Both theoretical backgrounds are sound, but which effect is actually 
happening in practice? If capital structure truly has no effect, then there should be no preference 
to how a firm finances a project, and therefore no difference between financing between internal 
cash, debt issues or equity issues. 
In practice, the uncertainty in the field may affect management's choices of financial activities. A 
further investigation and mapping of these decisions could bring more clarity, to both the 
academic and business worlds. This will then ultimately lead to a clearer picture as to which 
financing alternatives may be better in a certain situation to build the optimal capital structure for 
a firm. This will contribute to the literature regarding how managers make decisions, and why 
they make those decisions when it comes to external financing. Value maximization should 
always be the ultimate goal when it comes to investment decisions, and a clear, concise theory 
related to capital structure could help to maximize shareholder value and help potential 
shareholders make decisions about the firm. 
1.3	Purpose	
The purpose of this study is to investigate whether capital structure has any effect on the value of 
a firm. The basic methodology that is followed by Eckbo (1986) will be used in order to 
ascertain the effect capital structure has on the abnormal stock returns of a firm. 
1.4	Research	Question	
         “Are there any significant differences in the abnormal returns of firms that issue 
equity compared to firms that issue debt and how do the results align with the established capital 
structure theories?” 
A compelling answer to this may help to answer some questions that have arisen in the literature 
about information asymmetries, self-selection biases and other financing related activities that 
firms in the marketplace take part in, including monitoring, speed of information and managerial 
decision making. There is a gap in the literature, whereby there is no study done on both equity 
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and debt in this particular way, as a comparative side by side analysis using the event study 
approach.  
1.5	Restrictions	
This paper pools many kinds of debt and equity issuances into the same sub-sample, since the 
primary purpose is to map the difference between the two main kinds of financing alternatives. It 
does not take convertibles into account. Eckbo (1986), for instance, specified different kinds of 
debt issuances and convertibles, since his paper was based mainly on debt financing decisions. 
This kind of division could give a larger spectrum of analytical angles to tackle issues with, for 
instance, different risk levels in different kinds of debt issuances. 
Another restriction is that the event study in this paper is only performed following the market 
adjusted return model. This is since the focus is put on the theory application to the results rather 
than testing and comparing of different market model approaches for estimating the abnormal 
returns in event studies. 
A geographical restriction was made to isolate the sample to the NYSE index. This was to 
receive a comparable and manageable sample, both in size and other practical dimensions such 
as time differences between global stock exchanges, and similar firm characteristics. 
The paper also restricted industries in the sample so that financial and real estate firms were not 
included. This is because those kinds of firms tend to issue debt more frequently, without 
affecting their capital structure in the same way as regular industries. 
	1.6	Disposition	
Chapter 2 will discuss some of the current literature and theories that are relevant in this study, 
giving an overview of both theories, and arguing through the reasons as to why the respective 
theories produce the corresponding effects. A more in-depth discussion into how leverage ratios, 
asymmetric information and other related phenomena will be further discussed, and finally 
empirical studies will be scrutinized in order to support the empirical study conducted in this 
paper.  
Chapter 3 will discuss the methodology and data collection, the where, when and why of the 
study, followed by chapter 4 where the empirical study is conducted and discussed.  
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Chapter 5 will analyze the findings from chapter 4, and provide an in-depth discussion on how 
the results link to literature and other relevant information.  
Finally, chapter 6 will wrap up the study, and provide some suggestions for future research.  
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2.	Literature	Review	
2.1	Capital	Structure	
2.1.1	General	Foundation	
Modigliani-Miller (1958) propose that under certain assumptions, the choice of financing is 
irrelevant. Their two original propositions show that the value of a firm stays constant with 
increasing leverage, even though cost of debt, generally, is considered lower than cost of equity. 
This is because when a company chooses to increase their leverage, this causes an increase in 
risk to the existing equity holders, whom therefore demanded a higher return on equity. This will 
then outset the lower costs of debt and keep the weighted average cost of capital constant, 
regardless of the financing source. This, in turn, means that the firm value stays the same when 
using weighted average cost of capital as the discount rate in, for instance, a discounted cash 
flow model. The assumptions that MM used to build up the model include the absence of taxes 
and bankruptcy costs (later implemented in the Traditional Trade-off Theory). They also assume 
no agency costs and symmetric information (implemented in the Pecking Order Theory) and 
finally a completely efficient market. 
Fama and French (2002) explain that there are two competing theories when it comes to 
modeling financial decisions, especially related to outside financing. There is the Traditional 
Trade-off Theory, and the Pecking Order Theory, developed by Myers and Majluf (1984). While 
these theories are different, they are not polar opposites of each other in that they are built out of 
similar assumptions, but diverge at a point to give different results (Welch, 2007). The Trade-off 
Theory tends to be thought of more as an optimization model for capital structure, while the 
Pecking Order Theory is built on asymmetric information and adverse selection. Below is an in-
depth review of both theories. 
2.1.2	The	Traditional	Trade-off	Theory	
Frank and Goyal (2007) discuss that the original version of the Traditional Trade-off Theory 
actually grew out of the MM framework. Corporate taxes were introduced to their perfect world, 
and this destroyed their proposition that capital structure adds no value. Tax shields protect 
earnings from tax, and therefore debt becomes attractive. This creates the implication that 100 % 
debt financing is optimal. This is clearly against intuition, and once bankruptcy costs were 
introduced, the Traditional Trade-off Theory was created, trying to achieve the optimal level of 
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leverage by weighing up costs and benefits. When accounting for the complexity of the tax codes 
and the fact that bankruptcy costs cannot be transferred, different optimal leverages can be 
reached depending on how the variables are interpreted. 
According to Fama and French (2002), the Traditional Trade-off Theory is driven by an 
amalgam of different factors. It identifies an optimal leverage by weighing the benefit of one 
additional dollar in debt against the cost of that dollar. These benefits can include tax shields, and 
easier access to a cash flow, while the costs can include bankruptcy and agency costs. 
Bankruptcy costs can push this optimal leverage ratio lower while agency costs can push the 
same leverage ratio higher. This is a fairly basic interpretation of the theory, and there are 
expansions to the theory that can explain more of what is seen in reality. 
Ju et al (2005) observed that many firms are actually underlevered when compared to the 
predictions of optimization in the Traditional Trade-off Theory. According to them, the general 
consensus amongst researchers is that the bankruptcy costs are actually insignificant when 
compared to the benefits and value of what a tax shield can obtain. So why are firms generally 
underlevered? Is it because the agency costs associated with a firm's capital structure must be 
taken into account? It turns out that there are many factors to consider, more than the basic 
interpretations of the Traditional Trade-off Theory suggest. Factors such as the underlying risk of 
the firm's assets, maturity of debt, debtholders right to force default for a given level of firm 
value and the increasing bankruptcy costs conditional of that default must be considered to 
explain the leverage ratios seen in real working firms. 
2.1.3	The	Pecking	Order	Theory	
Myers and Majluf (1984) evolved a model to map the problems with management's information 
advantage against new potential investors when issuing and selling new equity. The model was 
founded under the assumptions that the issuing company’s management favoured the existing 
shareholders and that those existing shareholders were passive in their trading behaviour and 
hold their shares under the whole issuing procedure. Under those assumptions, the authors 
showed that existing shareholders are not always better off when the company chooses to raise 
equity to finance a positive net present value investment opportunity. In a two-state scenario 
where the management has knowledge about the outcome at time zero, the new potential 
shareholders will demand a larger part of existing assets. Sometimes the existing shareholders 
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are more satisfied from not raising capital and therefore also miss the investment opportunity. 
 
𝑆 + 𝑎 ≤ %∗%∗'( ∗ 𝐸 + 𝑆 + 𝑎 + 𝑏 → (%∗'( ∗ 𝑆 + 𝑎 ≤ %∗%∗'( ∗ (𝐸 + 𝑏)  Equation 2.1 
 
In Equation 2.1, 𝑃∗equals the equilibrium value of the firm under the condition that an issue 
takes place. 𝐸 is the minimum issue size value for the company to be able to undertake an 
investment. (Or the size of the investment minus company slack, so that	𝐸 = 𝐼 − 𝑆). 𝑎 is the 
value of assets in place and 𝑏 the net present value of the investment opportunities (Myers & 
Majluf, 1984).  
This meant that if potential new shareholders received a large enough part of the existing value 
by investing, and if the investment opportunity generated a small enough 𝑏 this would cause an 
unwillingness of the existing shareholders to go through with the issuance and the investment. 
This was since they would be better off with their pre-issuance equity value. Furthermore, the 
authors could conclude that an issuance of equity would be a signal to the shareholders that the 
share-value before the issuance is overpriced. Otherwise it would not be worth for existing 
shareholders to issue new equity. Therefore, an announcement of an equity issue should reduce 
the stock price if the new potential investors behave rationally (Myers & Majluf, 1984). 
Myers and Majluf (1984) also showed that the lower risk to potential new investors, the larger 
possibility for the company’s management to undertake the issue and the investment. They 
introduced the concept of debt issuance to show that a choice of issuing total risk free debt would 
mean that the company would undertake all positive net present value project as long as 𝑏 is 
positive. This would also mean that the stock value would be preserved even after the debt 
issuance. When the risk of the issuance increases, the company would only undertake 
investments where the size of 𝑏 is large enough to offset the increased risk. Since issuing of debt 
is considered, generally, to be less risky than issuing of equity, the model could then conclude 
that a company would prefer issuing debt before issuing equity. 
Frank and Goyal (2003) tackle the Pecking Order Theory from a different angle in their study 
which explores the extent to which the Pecking Order Theory explains the capital structure 
behaviour of publicly traded American firms in the period 1971-1998. They observed that the 
8	
	
key claims of the Pecking Order Theory do not hold when examining firms from the same period 
and claim that equity financing tends to be a much more significant component of external 
financing than the Pecking Order Theory would suggest.  In fact, they see that net debt issues are 
actually smaller than net equity issues and that these forms of external financing actually exceed 
the net investment. Their results showed that when examining a narrow, restricted range of firms, 
the Pecking Order Theory held, but when expanding the sample size to more firms, which 
include smaller firms, this changed. The smaller firms, which usually finance with equity, 
brought the average equity issues up, and therefore took some explanatory power away from the 
Pecking Order Theory. 
2.1.4	Comparison	
There are many different opinions in the literature when trying to pair off the two theories. 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) found that when considering profitability and leverage, there is 
a negative relationship between the two, which gives credit to the Pecking Order Theory’s 
predictions. Fama and French (2002) managed to acquire the same result, but found that leverage 
is sensitive to changes in earnings, which is more in line with the Traditional Trade-off Theory. 
In contrast to this negative relationship, Hovakimian et al. (2001) reported that firms that were 
issuing debt over equity tended to be more profitable, and this give credit to dynamic trade off 
theories. They also managed to deduce that market-to-book ratios have a positive correlation on 
both probabilities of a debt vs equity issue as well as the observed debt ratio, which is consistent 
with both Pecking Order and Traditional Trade-off Theories. Disputing this, Baker and Wurgler 
(2002) suggest capital structure actually reflects more about the timing of the equity markets, and 
that the market-to-book ratios have no negative effects on the firm's leverages, so therefore 
neither theory is sufficient to explain the observations. Hovakimian et al. (2004) find that 
profitability actually has no effect on target leverage, and that the effect on stock returns are 
unrelated to leverage, which is due to the Pecking Order Theory. They do advise a caution when 
making assumptions about the capital structure decisions, since they speculate that firms may try 
to take advantage of overpriced stocks and issue equity, even when there is sufficient capacity 
for debt. So, in certain cases, overvalued stocks can overpower an equity issue’s negative 
consequences. 
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2.2	Information	Asymmetry,	Adverse	Selection	and	Agency	Theory	
2.2.1	Information	Asymmetry	
The Pecking Order Theory is based on an assumption of adverse selection and information 
asymmetry between managers and new potential shareholders. Akerlof (1970) highlighted this 
kind of problem in the automobile and insurance industry. He meant that one of the most crucial 
problems with adverse selection (in this case from management) is the welfare loss that it 
incorporates when; in this case, positive net present value projects are abandoned. 
Asymmetric information models can be applied in a large field of studies. Tirole (2006) 
developed a model for corporate investments concepts where he used a bank’s investment in an 
entrepreneurial investment opportunity as example for how probable it is for an investor to 
undertake a positive net present value investment under asymmetric information. He assumed 
that the investor and the entrepreneur were risk neutral and there were only two kinds of 
borrowers (good and bad). Under the assumption that the entrepreneurs had a greater amount of 
information about the state of the entrepreneur (and therefore indirectly the probability that the 
undertaking investment will generate positive outcomes), Tirole meant that investors would only 
invest as long as the known share of good entrepreneurs 𝛼 was large enough. So that: 
 𝛼 ∗ 𝑝𝑅 − 𝐼 + 1 − 𝛼 ∗ (𝑞𝑅 − 𝐼) > 0    Equation 2.2 
 
In Equation 2.2 𝛼 is a positive number smaller than 1. 𝑝𝑅 is the return times the probability of 
success under a good behaving agent and 𝑞𝑅 the same under a bad behaving agent. 𝐼 is the 
investment size. A further condition is that 𝑝𝑅 >	𝐼 >	𝑞𝑅. This is in contrast to when the investor 
actually knows what entrepreneurs are good respectively bad. Then they would invest in good 
entrepreneurial investment opportunities as long as:  	𝑝 𝑅 − 𝑅9 − 𝐼 > 0      Equation 2.3 
 
In Equation 2.3 𝑅9  is the compensation for the borrower and 𝑅 the total compensation. 
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2.2.2	Adverse	Selection	
Myers (1984) applies asymmetric information to external financing and comes up with some 
interesting insights. If the manager has favourable information, and investors have less 
information, then the manager will try to make sure that he can maximize the difference between 
the intrinsic value of the shares and the selling price of those same shares, thus meaning the 
shares will be overpriced or overvalued. This is assumed by investors to be the case, that the 
manager is not on their side, and the investors will therefore adjust the price they are willing to 
pay, in order to counteract this lack of information that they have. 
Myers (1984) defined delta N as the amount the shares are under or overvalued. So, if delta N is 
negative, then the information available to the manager is unfavourable, so therefore the firm 
will always issue, even if there is a 0 net present value project, and the only good thing to do 
with the money from the issue is to put it into the bank. If there is favourable information 
available, then the manager will not issue, and may pass up on a positive net present value 
project rather than issue undervalued stocks. So, a situation occurs where the manager will try to 
use the information asymmetries to his/her advantage. This sends a signal to the investors that 
either way, whether buying new stocks that are issued, or holding onto old stocks, the price must 
be adjusted for in order to combat asymmetric information. 
Frank and Goyal (2003) say that financing behaviour is driven by adverse selection costs, which 
is what Myers (1984) was explaining in the above paragraph. So therefore, the Pecking Order 
Theory should be very apparent in firms that have severe adverse selection issues. Usually it is 
firms that are young, small with high growth that have the largest information asymmetries, 
which in turn suggests that there are the largest adverse selection costs in these firms. The 
empirical evidence rejects this theory. The evidence actually suggests that the large, mature firms 
actually display aspects of the Pecking Order Theory rather than the small young firms. This is 
strange because larger firms are usually considered to have very low adverse selection problems, 
and therefore low information asymmetries. This may be due to an effect that for firms of all 
sizes, the financing deficit becomes less and less significant over time. 
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2.2.3	Agency	Theory	
Easterbrook (1984) saw dividends as the best way to constrain agents. He suggested that forcing 
a firm into the capital markets sets up signaling and monitoring effects that will force the 
managers into good behaviour. Therefore, they will not misuse their power over the free cash in 
the firm, and make sure that the resources go towards sustainable growth and therefore less 
agency costs. 
Jensen (1986) built upon the work of Easterbrook (1984) and suggested that free cash has 
substantial costs associated with it. This is because agents are inherently prone to misbehaviour, 
and if an agent has the opportunity, he or she will misuse that cash for his or her own personal 
advantage. This is mainly due to the fact that compensation is related to the size of the firm, so 
they may misuse the cash, to finance unsustainable growth over the short term. Easterbrook 
(1984) suggesting using dividends to achieve this constraint is very weak according to Jensen. 
This is because “permanent” dividends can actually be recalled at any time, so it still gives the 
managers huge power over the free cash. Jensen suggests taking on as much debt as possible to 
combat this, therefore restraining managers because there is a very strong signal, and there is no 
way for the managers to avoid the debt repayments if they have the funds on hand. This debt can 
be used to finance new projects or repurchase stocks, and serves as a monitoring effect since the 
debt holders can take the firm to bankruptcy if their debt obligations are not met. 
2.3	Empirical	Applications	
2.3.1	Short	Term	Event	Window	
Eckbo (1986) wanted to estimate the short term signaling effect of debt issues on abnormal stock 
returns to see how the market reacts to a debt increasing capital structure announcement. He did 
so by using a regression model where he estimated the abnormal returns of four different kinds 
of debt offering events. The regression model was built up from a capital market model where he 
added 723 short term pre- and post-event window dummy variables of (2-20 days), one for each 
debt-offering event. The dummy variables took the value of 1 before the event happened (and 
during the day of the event) and the value of 0 after the event had occurred.  
The dates of the events he found through a three-step process. Firstly, he sorted out yearly debt 
changes from the Compustat data-base. If the increase in debt in one year was large enough (over 
50 million USD) he looked the company up in the Wall Street Journal Index to see if there had 
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been any indications of a debt issue announcement during the year. For those companies that had 
announced a debt issue he then used the announcement date as the event day in his regression 
model. He also adjusted his sample by dropping events for which the announcement date was 
unclear or unable to find out by looking in the Wall Street Journal Index. His results indicated an 
average drop of 0.06 % in abnormal returns for a straight debt issuance announcement (Eckbo, 
1986). 
2.3.2	Long	Term	Event	Window	
Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1998) find some problems with using short term abnormal returns 
over a long horizon. They feel that this method biases the results, which leads to incorrect 
statistical conclusion, and try to combat this by using long term abnormal returns over a long 
horizon. Their results, after several robustness tests, actually challenge what Eckbo (1986) found 
about debt issues on stock returns. They found that the market under reacts to the information, 
and therefore the effect is that the long term abnormal stock return, after the event has taken 
place, is of the same sign as in the announcement period. This all basically adds up the abnormal 
return changing significantly with a debt issue. It is worth noting that they found that many 
forms of events produce this same result, including equity issues, acquisitions, divestitures, stock 
splits and many other forms of corporate financial decisions. This effect could be due to the 
nature of short termism over the long term, or to unnecessary noise corrupting the results and 
biasing them towards the negative. 
2.3.3	Self-Selection	Bias	
Dutordoir and Hodrick (2012), found three different effects that capital structure decisions have 
on the abnormal returns. Stock returns around straight debt announcements are related to proxies 
for debt related financing costs negatively and positively for proxies regarding equity related 
adverse selection costs. Seasoned equity offerings and their effects on stock returns have a 
negative relation to firms that have easy access and a large capacity for debt, and positive 
relation for firms with larger pre-announcement stock run-ups. Finally, announcements of 
convertible debt have a positive effect on firms that have large costs in attracting debt or equity 
financing. 
The authors put this down to an issue of self-selection control. The firm's managers will use their 
advantage of information asymmetries to raise the funds that are needed in a way that will have 
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the least negative impact on their abnormal returns. This will all be due to the financial health of 
the firm, and to some extent, the industry or area that the firm is operating in. This helps to 
explain some of the properties of the Pecking Order Theory, namely the informational 
asymmetries aspect, yet there is also some evidence that goes against the theory. The evidence 
suggests that the stock returns are not completely explained by the equity related adverse 
selection costs. There is also evidence that debt related financing costs play an important role, as 
to why some firms choose equity over debt (Dutordoir & Hodrick, 2012). 
2.3.4	Pecking	Order	Characteristics	
Leary and Roberts (2010) tested another way to the estimate empirical relevance of the Pecking 
Order Theory. They started by assuming two ways that companies could build their capital 
structure in accordance to the Pecking Order Theory, a strict and a liberal way. The strict way 
assumed that a company would not use an inferior finance source, such as equity financing, until 
the superior financing source, such as internally generated cash flows, was entirely drained. 
From this assumption, they could build up a model that could predict the source of the upcoming 
financing decision according to the Pecking Order Theory. They found that just 20 % of the 
firms followed the Pecking Order predictions. They therefore tested a more liberal model, which 
included the addition of elements like tax adjustments and bankruptcy probabilities that are more 
recognized as measurements used in Traditional Trade-off framework. When using this model, 
they received an increased prediction ability of the test, up to 80 %. It is hard to say how much of 
this increased that was due to the Traditional Trade-off elements and how much came from the 
cooperation of the elements from the different theories. 
One further finding from Leary and Roberts (2010) study was that the factors for the financial 
decisions in accordance to the Pecking Order were driven by incentive conflicts from 
management rather than from information asymmetry as the original framework states. This is an 
interesting note even though those drivers are directly affecting each other. 
2.4	Critical	Examination	
2.4.1	Capital	Structure	Critics	
There are problems with most of the models for estimating capital structure and changes in 
capital structure. Welch (2007) discussed three main flaws that he found in the most common 
empirical models. Firstly, he discussed the relationship between changes in debt over assets and 
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actual change in equity over assets. In theory those measurements should be clearly negatively 
correlated, since they seem to be the major financing alternatives for a firm. Strangely, he found 
no large correlation or explanatory power between those changes, but instead found that the 
relationship between change in non-financial liabilities (such as account payables, other 
liabilities, etc.) and change in equity, which implies that the firm in a high degree can affect 
those accounts as financing alternatives. Secondly, he questioned the linearity and partial 
exogeneity in the models for change in debt and equity ratios. He suggested that other factors 
that are affected by the capital structure change may, in turn, affect the ratios and therefore 
increase the effect of the ratio more for firms with relatively large changes in their ratios. Welch 
meant though that those kinds of non-linearity problems can be easily handled when more 
advanced statistical tools are available. Lastly, there is the problem with data flaws. Welch found 
that one of the main problems in the Compustat database is that about 10 % of the firms 
disappear and reappear annually. This makes it really hard to actually replicate studies and 
validate results in a feasible manner. 
2.4.2	Event	Study	Approach	Critics	
The event study approach to estimate abnormal returns has been widely used and traced back all 
the way to the 1930´s (MacKinley, 1997). There are several ways to estimate the event formula 
and the calculation of abnormal returns in an event study. The data can consist of different 
observation intervals, such as daily or weekly data. Brown and Warner (1985) discussed some 
common flaws that may occur when using a daily data approach to the study. Some of the flaws 
mentioned are the non-normality problem, non-synchronized trading and variance estimation 
problems. The non-normality problem may be a problem for statistical tests with an abnormal 
return sample that gets fat tailed distributions. This is a common problem when estimating any 
kinds of financial data samples. The non-synchronized trading problem may occur when the 
event takes place under a time when the market cannot or will not react instantly. This becomes 
more of a problem when using daily returns as estimation, since those estimations often assume 
an instant reaction. In an empirical study, there is therefore good to include some margins when 
estimating an event and the effects of an event. Variance problems may occur for several 
reasons. There may be time series-biases, cross sectional biases or stationarity problems that can 
affect the variances and cause biases. This is something that needs to be taken in consideration 
when analyzing the results from hypothesis tests and regressions run with abnormal returns. 
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Brown and Warner suggest that some of these problems may be taken in account when 
estimating the t-statistics (for instance the time series-biases for longer event windows). Other 
problems may be minor and taken in account when discussing the results (Brown and Warner, 
1995). 
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3.	Methodology	
3.1	Data	Set	
The data set was constructed as a mix from two different data sources. Firstly, all market data 
was collected off the CRSP database. The market data consisted of all companies on the NYSE 
from the period January, 1 in 2007 to December, 31 in 2012. Daily data was extracted from this 
date range, with particular attention paid to stock prices, dates, market returns and company 
names. Other information that proved useful was the company's TIC numbers, but it did not 
feature in the final results. The data here, especially corresponding to the stock prices and market 
prices is measured from close of the day before to the close of that particular day, so in a closed 
to closed format.  
The second part of the data set was collected from the Capital IQ database. Here the actual 
events were extracted, the dates on which those events transpired and the magnitude of the 
events, i.e., the size of the equity and debt issues. The events consisted of equity issues as well as 
debt issues. There was no distinction between the straight debt issues, but in the equity issue 
section, IPOs were excluded. This was because there was a lack of market information leading 
up to IPOs, so the event had no impact on any abnormal returns, since the company wasn't active 
on the market just yet. Financial institutions were also excluded from the data; this includes 
banks, insurance and real estate companies. These were excluded because these financial 
institutions tend to issue lots of debt without impacting their capital structure very much. Lastly, 
a restriction was put on the size of the issues, and only issues that were above $500 million were 
considered. This restriction on the issue size was chosen, because of the argument raised by 
Frank and Goyal (2003), where they find that empirically, larger firms have a higher possibility 
to display characteristics in line with capital structure theories. It is not uncommon to use 
restrictions of this sort in these kinds of studies, since Eckbo (1986) added a similar, lowest value 
threshold in his study. 
Merging the two data sets proved to be quite time consuming. The data needed to be filtered into 
companies, and then the events, dates and issue sizes matched exactly, using the TIC numbers as 
a sorting instrument. A dummy variable was constructed to indicate when the event took place, 
which took the value of 1 on the day of the event and the relevant days afterwards, up to T+n 
days. T is the actual event day, that takes the value of 1, and n is the number of days directly 
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following the event day. A value of 0 was given to all other dates. Where an event took place, the 
magnitude of the issue was also matched to its respective event. 
The data came from two different sources, so there were omissions that were necessary. Firstly, 
any event that took place on the very first, or very last day of the estimation period had to be 
omitted, since there was a lack of data on either the stock returns, or the preceding day after the 
event took place. Secondly any IPOs were omitted, as explained before. Thirdly, there were 
some events that did not match up. An example of this was that an event was registered, but there 
was no market data at all about the company, so these events had to be omitted as well. 
This led to a data set during the period that had 604 debt events and 87 equity events spread over 
258 companies. 
3.2	Quantitative	Method	
3.2.1	Reliability	
The reliability of the data is always an issue when conducting these kinds of statistical studies. 
The data set that was constructed in this study is large enough to give reliable results, and many 
of the issues that arise from the general problems that are present in data sets, such as 
heteroscedasticity, have been accounted for where possible. It is appropriate for what is trying to 
be achieved, is largely error free, and is not missing very many observations. One of the 
reliability issues that may occur when gathering data from different databases, as in this study, is 
that the possibility to replicate the study decreases. For the study to contribute with a high 
reliability it is important that the method section is clear with where observations were lost 
during the making and merging of the final data set. This is also so that future studies with the 
same methodological framework can get a comparable view of this study’s findings for their own 
analysis (Saunders et al., 2009 p. 156).  
3.2.2	Validity	
To avoid validity problems, the data collection for this study was performed with the attempt to 
be as complete as possible. This was mainly to avoid subjectiveness and biases in the extraction 
of the empirical results (Saunders et al., 2009 p. 157). The only observation drops that occurred 
in the study were due to incomplete or non-matching data. Some variables have been winsorized 
to fit the purpose of the variable, for instance Equity Value to EBITDA.  
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The main databases used in the study, CRSP and Capital IQ, are reputable, and the data is widely 
available through many different sources. 
To increase the validity of the study, some important assumptions are tested. First there was a 
test performed on the assumption that the results from companies issuing debt could be 
compared to results from companies issuing equity. A feasible outcome of this test would 
suggest a similarity between those kinds of firms in the time period when they are financially 
active with capital issuances. Other tests were performed on the abnormal return to see if the size 
of the issue and chronological changes in the macroeconomic environment could significantly 
affect the abnormal returns. 
3.3	Method	
3.3.1	Firm	Similarity	Tests	
The firm similarity test was performed by measuring certain accounting measurements on the 
firm during the time period of the issuance, in order to see if they affected the decision to issue 
equity or debt. This is important since a comparison between the debt and equity issuing firms 
would be biased if the firms were not somewhat similar in terms of their profitability, valuation 
and capital structure before issuance and size. 
The measurements used were a size measurement in terms of the natural logarithm of total 
assets, a leverage ratio and a market valuation measurement that would work as a proxy for 
Price-to-Earnings. A Price-to-Earnings ratio was chosen, since this is one of the most widely 
used valuation measurements and a good indicator on the firm attributes and an underlying factor 
to financial decisions (Jitmaneeroj, 2017). With the data available, this second measurement was 
measured as the market capitalization (or Equity Value of outstanding shares) divided by 
EBITDA. All negative values of the ratio were restricted and made to equal 0 because negative 
EBITDAs are inefficient at predicting firm values in this specific multiple. This is because the 
sign flips the interpretation of the coefficient, therefore is not feasible to have negative and 
positive ratios in the same parameter, in the same regression. The leverage ratio was estimated as 
non-equity financing over assets. A pure debt numerator would probably be a better 
measurement, but since it would be harder to estimate and the data would be harder to get for 
this large amount of companies, this study instead used the Equation 3.1 as a proxy for leverage. 
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(1 − (:;<=>?@A;BCD=@AEFFB=F )     Equation 3.1 
To adjust for differences in between industries, a vector of industry dummies was included, 
taking the value of 1 for a specific industry. There were 7 industry dummies included in the 
regression. The dependent variable was constructed by assigning a dummy variable taking the 
value of 1 for the equity issuing firms and the value of 0 for the debt issuing firms. A regression 
was then run using a probit model on the entire issuing sample. Furthermore, an assumption was 
applied that there was no present heteroscedasticity in the regression model. This since the left-
hand side carried binary values meaning that possible heteroscedasticity would mean that the 
model was misspecified. The regression model was specified in Equation 3.2. 
 
𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦=,< = 𝛼 + 𝛽T ∗ 𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)=,< + 𝛽Z ∗ (:;<=>?@A;B([\C]E =,< + 𝛽^ ∗ (1 − (:;<=>?@A;BCD=@AEFFB=F =,<) + 𝛽_'^ ∗𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦_ =,< + 𝜀=,<     Equation 3.2 
  
3.3.2	Event	Study	
In accordance with Eckbo (1986), an event study approach was used to calculate the abnormal 
returns from the two samples. It must be noted that announcements of debt and equity is used, 
since the investigation will try to determine whether the news hitting the market has any effect 
on the abnormal returns. The actual issue date has no real relevance in this particular study. 
Instead of using Eckbo’s market model with an annual estimation window per event, this study 
uses a market adjusted return model where the betas were assumed to be 1 and alphas 0. This 
kind of model should be used carefully (MacKinlay, 1997), but in this study, it was feasible from 
following arguments;  
The market adjusted return model has several benefits and drawbacks compared to the regular 
market model. One benefit is that there is no need to include an estimation window. In this kind 
of study, where the events are spread out over a large number of different time periods, it causes 
problems when setting reliable estimation windows, especially since the time period stretches 
over a volatile period including financial market instability. To avoid the noise that may occur 
when applying the regular market model, an assumption of stock movements close to the market 
returns was made. In this kind of study, the market model would force the estimation windows to 
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be calculated separately for each event, which would be a time consuming and subjective 
procedure. There is also an estimation uncertainty in the beta that is so large that a beta value 
equals 1 can often not be rejected Blume and Friend (1973). The estimated returns were then 
subsequently estimated by Equation 3.3. 
 	𝐸 𝑅F = 𝛼 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝑅b → 𝐸 𝑅F = 0 + 1 ∗ 𝑅b →	 𝐸 𝑅F = 𝑅b Equation 3.3 
The errors are assumed to have an expectation of 0. So, no error term is included. 
A small sample test was also performed to see how much the abnormal returns differed when 
using the market model versus the market adjusted return model. The outcome was that the 
average difference was very small. Assumingly, a larger sample would decrease the average 
difference even more. With these results in mind, the rest of the study, the analysis of the results 
and the theoretical background was based on the market adjusted return model.  
To calculate the abnormal returns, the estimated returns were subtracted from the actual returns 
during the event time frame according to Equation 3.4. The event time frame per event was 
decided by the day of the event and the days after the event up to T+3. The days after the event 
were included to account for issue announcements that had occurred after the NYSE's close. 
Those announcements will not be reflected in the changes of the stock price until the day after 
the event. That meant that the number of abnormal returns received was twice, three times or 
four times the size of the total number of events in each sample, depending on day T+n. 	𝑅F − 𝐸 𝑅F = 𝐴𝑏𝑛	(𝑅F)     Equation 3.4 
 
When the abnormal returns were received, an average was estimated per event to reflect and 
standardize the T+n abnormal return into a daily return measure in accordance with the 
framework from Eckbo’s (1986) study. 
Once the abnormal returns have been calculated, all the information that was needed in order to 
complete the empirical study was acquired. All the abnormal returns that occur on the dates that 
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events occur, when the dummy variable equals one, are moved onto a separate document to be 
prepared for statistical tests. 
Firstly, the abnormal returns that occur only on the actual day of the event are assessed. Equity 
issues and debt issues are separated out, so that a difference can be found, if any exists. All 
relevant information needed to conduct a T-test is calculated, including mean, standard 
deviation, degrees of freedom and P-values. The T-test is then conducted for both equity and 
debt. Even though Brown and Warner (1995) mentioned problems with non-normality in the 
abnormal returns, there is an assumption made in this study that the sample is normally 
distributed in all hypothesis tests to make the empirical setup possible. The non-synchronized 
trading and variance problems are reduced due to the variety of event window setups in the 
study. 
 	𝐻d:𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 = 0	𝐻T:𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 ≠ 0 
 
The tests were performed with an event window stretching from the day of the announcement 
event (T) to, T+n so that n=0, 1, 2 or 3. This was to estimate the total short term impact of the 
issuance activity. The average cumulative abnormal returns were estimated using a single day 
approach, as well as the average over the same estimation period to see if the abnormal return 
shock faded away gradually, or was present on only one day. 
 Secondly a two sample T-test and a Satterwaite-Welch test were then conducted, in order to see 
if the values of the abnormal returns on equity and debt issuing companies are significantly 
different from each other. The null hypothesis was that the averages were equal. 
 𝐻d:𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑆T = 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑆Z  𝐻T:𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑆T ≠ 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑆Z  
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3.3.3	Affecting	Factors	on	Abnormal	Returns	
From a theoretically discussed view (for instance Eckbo (1986), the most accurate reaction 
results of the issuance should come from an average abnormal return of the T+n model where 
n=1. To test other factors that may affect the abnormal returns, a regression was therefore run 
with those average cumulative abnormal returns as the dependent variable. The explaining 
variables attached here were the size of the issue. Since the study excluded all issuances under a 
value of $500 million, this was then the minimum value in the regression. Additionally, a 
variable measuring the macroeconomic environment in the US over the time of the issuance was 
used. This measurement was the monthly change of CFNAI index. The CFNAI index includes an 
array of up to 85 macroeconomic variables such as housing supply, national retail revenues and 
industrial production, Chicagofed.org (2017). The regression was then run using OLS on the 
equity issuance sample, the debt issuance sample and a merged sample. A White test was applied 
to test if the variance of the residuals was constant or if there was any heteroscedasticity present 
in the estimation model. The regression model is specified in Equation 3.5. 𝐴𝑏𝑛	(𝑅)=,< = 𝛼 + 𝛽T ∗ 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒=,< + 𝛽Z ∗ ∆𝐶𝐹𝑁𝐴𝐼=,< + 𝜀=,<  Equation 3.5  
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4.	Empirical	Results	
4.1	Company	Similarity	Test	
	
Dependent 
variable: 
Equity dummy 
  
Coefficient 
  
P-value 
Descriptive Stats 
Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Ln Total 
Assets -0.099 0.116 9.948 1.182 6.381 13.629 
Equity 
Value/EBITDA 0.009 0.125 7.184 8.923 0 188.724 
Leverage ratio 0.072 0.782 0.263 0.286 0 0.958 
Industry 
dummies: 		 		 		 		 		 		
Consumer 
Staples -1.132 0.011 0.161 0.368 0 1 
Consumer 
Discretionary 0.378 0.185 0.124 0,336 0 1 
Energy 0.141 0.613 0.217 0.413 0 1 
Healthcare -0.112 0.733 0.101 0.301 0 1 
Industrials -0.234 0.452 0.137 0.344 0 1 
Information 
technology -0.912 0.069 0.082 0.275 0 1 
Materials 0.389 0.206 0.092 0.344 0 1 
Intersect -0.287 0.672         
Number of obs. 644 		 		 		 		 		
R^2 0.104 		 		 		 		 		
Table 1 
In table 1 the results from the company similarity test are shown which correspond to equation 1. 
There was an observation loss of 47 observations (about 7 % of the entire sample) due to 
incomplete data. None of the firm specifics seem to have a significant impact on the choice of 
financing. The only significance in the regression is coming from some of the industry specifics. 
From this it can be seen that Consumer Staples and Information Technology firms are 
significantly more likely to issue debt instead of equity at a 0.1 significance level. This is since 
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the coefficients are negative in those variables. Also, the explaining factor of the independent 
variables on the financial choice seems to be only about 10.4 %. Since there is no further 
significance in the test, the assumption is that the debt and equity issuing companies are fairly 
similar and no further adjustments should be needed in the abnormal returns calculation and 
interpretation. 
4.2	Event	Study	Results	
4.2.1	Average	Effects	
4.2.1.1	Results	from	Day	of	the	Event                              	
The average cumulative abnormal returns (ACAR) were calculated in accordance with equation 
3 for all tests. 
	
Equity 
issues Debt issues 
ACAR (%) -0.348 0.077 
Std. Dev 0.033 0.022 
T-stats -0.994 0.933 
P-value 0.161 0.175 
Table 2 
In table 2 the results from the two tailed hypothesis tests that were conducted for both equity and 
debt issues using the abnormal returns from the day of the event can be seen. While there is a 
difference in the ACAR, with equity issues giving a negative value, and debt positive, they are 
very small, almost zero. In fact, once the hypothesis test is conducted, the P-values for equity and 
debt are 0.161 and 0.175 respectively. Therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, which 
translates into the ACARs not being significantly different from zero.  
	
Degrees of 
freedom T-statistics P-value 
Student’s t-
test 689 1.678 0.094 
Satterwaite-
Welch t-test 95.571 1.180 0.241 
Table 3 
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The two sample T-test is shown in table 3, which is a test for the equality of means, returned 
similar results, and helped reinforce what was learned in the hypothesis tests. The mean is the 
ACAR. Using all the data about the abnormal returns on the event dates, it can be seen whether 
both means of equity and debt issues are equal. The t-test returns a P-value of 0.094, which 
means that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected on a 0.05 significance level. This translates into 
means that are different from each other at the 0.05 significance level, but not at the 0.1 
significance level. 
The Satterthwaite-Welch t-test, according to Spellman and Whiting (2014, pp. 174-175), tests for 
the same results as the traditional t-test, but it is more appropriate if there is a large difference in 
variance or sample size. In this study, this may be a more appropriate test, since there is a large 
difference in sample sizes between the equity and debt issues. The results are far more 
insignificant, which pairs up more closely to the results acquired from the earlier hypothesis 
tests, that the means are not significantly different from each other. The null hypothesis is not 
rejected at any significance level since the P-value is 0.24 so therefore the means are not 
statistically different.  
4.2.1.2	Results	Including	Day	after	the	Event	
	
Equity 
issues Debt issues 
ACAR (%) -1.548 -0.015 
Std. Dev 0.027 0.014 
T-stats -5.175 -0.264 
P-value >0.001 0.395 
Table 4 
In table 4 the average two-day returns in connection to the issuing events were measured. Here, 
the day of the event and the day after the event were used. This test resulted in a negative ACAR 
for both kinds of issues. The coefficient representing the ACAR for the equity issue was -1.550 
% and for the debt issue -0.015 %. In this test, the coefficient for equity issues was clearly 
significant with a p-value far below 0.01. In the case of the debt issuance there was no 
significance in the results, even though the size of the standard deviation decreased somewhat. 
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Degrees of 
freedom T-statistics P-value 
Student’s t-
test 689 7.982 >0.001 
Satterwaite-
Welch t-test 92.760 5.027 >0.001 
Table 5  
Table 5 shows that when testing the means against each other in the two-day return framework, a 
significant difference was derived. The difference was significant both when using the 
traditional, student’s t-test and when adjusting for unequal sample sizes in the Satterwaite-Welch 
t-test on a 0.01 significance level. 
4.2.1.3	Results	Including	Two	Days	after	Event	
	
	
Equity 
issues Debt issues 
ACAR (%) -1.042 -0.033 
Std. Dev 0.022 0.011 
T-stats -4.822 -0.001 
P-value >0.001 0.500 
Table 6  
Table 6 shows the results from the same hypothesis test carried out before. Here the effect two 
days after the event happened can be seen. There was still a very small change in the ACAR of 
the Debt issue, but the Equity issue was still significant and fairly large at -1.042 % with a P-
Value of >0.001. This means that the ACAR of the debt issues, which carried a P-value of 0.5 
and a non-rejection of the null hypothesis, is not statistically different from 0, while the equity 
issues ACAR is, since the null hypothesis can be rejected. 
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Degrees of 
freedom T-statistics P-value 
Student’s t-
test 689 -7.324 >0.001 
Satterwaite-
Welch t-test 92 -4.580 >0.001 
Table 7  
Table 7, shows once again that the null hypothesis can be rejected, so this means that the means 
are statistically different from one another, which corresponds to the hypothesis test conducted 
earlier. 
4.2.1.4	Results	Including	Three	Days	after	the	Event	
  
	
Equity 
issues Debt issues 
ACAR (%) -0.725 -0.043 
Std. Dev 0.016 0.012 
T-stats -4.037 -0.891 
P-value >0.001 0.190 
Table 8  
Table 8 shows the effect is still present from the equity issue. With an ACAR of -0.725 % and a 
P-value of  >0.001, the null hypothesis can be rejected, meaning the ACAR is different from 0. 
Debt issues ACAR once again were not different from 0. 
	
Degrees of 
freedom T-statistics P-value 
Student’s t-
test 689 -4.684 >0.001 
Satterwaite-
Welch t-test 99 -3.666 >0.001 
Table 9 
Finally, table 9 shows that the equality test returns a result that the means are once again 
statistically different from each other, since the null hypothesis can be rejected, which means that 
they are not equal. 
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4.2.1.5	Average	ACAR	Graphed	
	
Day (T+n) Equity Issue (%) 
Debt Issue 
(%) 
T+0 -0.348 0.076 
T+1 -1.548 -0.015 
T+2 -1.042 -0.033 
T+3 -0.725 -0.043 
Table 10 
Table 10 shows the average change in the means over the days after the event, all the way up to 
T+3 which correspond to the event date + 3 days. The change in the ACAR that is averaged out 
over all the days can be seen. The debt issues hold quite steady, ranging very small amounts 
from 0.076 % to -0.043 % over T+3 days. Equity issues however show a different story, there are 
large changes in the magnitude of the changes in the ACAR, from -0.348 % at T, then jumping 
up to -1.548 % at T+1, and tapering down at -1.042 % at T+2 and -0.725 % at T+3. It is 
suspected that it is reverting back towards a mean, probably lower than before. The effect can be 
seen in Figure 1 below, where debt issues do not generate a large response, while equity issues 
generate a large movement in the negative direction, and then begin to come back towards where 
they started from. 
  Figure 1		
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4.2.2	Individual	Day	Effects	
4.2.2.1	Individual	Day	ACAR	
When separating the actual individual days, the following effects are observed, shown in table 
11. These are only values for equity issues, since debt issues are insignificant. 
Equity 
Issues T+0 T+1 T+2 T+3 
ACAR (%) -0.348 -2.747 -0.030 0.227 
Std. Dev 0.032 0.057 0.023 0.024 
T-Stats -0.994 -4.431 -0.120 0.867 
P-Value 0.161 > 0.001 0.452 0.806 
Table 11 
The only significance is on day T+1 which corresponds to the day after the event. It has a P-
value of >0.001 and therefore the null hypothesis can be rejected. There is also the largest 
absolute change in ACAR, at 2.747 %. All other days have insignificant P-values and therefore 
cannot be rejected.  
4.2.2.2	Individual	ACAR	Graphed	
  
Day (T+n) Equity Issue (%) 
Debt Issue 
(%) 
T+0 -0.348 0.077 
T+1 -2.748 -0.108 
T+2 -0.030 -0.068 
T+3 0.228 -0.075 
Table 12 
Table 12 shows the changes in the ACAR for each individual day. Now, by breaking apart and 
separating the days, the actual effect that the event had can be isolated. As was discovered before 
the actual effect of the event happens at day T+1, and a large change in the ACAR for the equity 
issue on this date can be seen. The magnitude of the change is -2.748 % then moving back to a 
similar amount on day T+2 and T+3, which are both similar to day T. No large swings in the 
value of the debt issues are seen, with the magnitude ranging from 0.077 % to -0.108 %. In 
Figure 2 below, the effect can be seen a little more clearly. There is a large change in the ACAR 
30	
	
of equity issuing companies at day T+1, which reverts back to close to its previous value.	
	Figure 2 	
4.3	Effects	on	the	Abnormal	Returns	
  
  
Dependent 
variable: 
T+1 ACAR 
  
All 
issuances 
  
Debt 
issuances 
  
Equity 
issuances 
Descriptive Stats (All Issuances) 
Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
CFNAI (p-
value) 
-0.088 
(0.164) 
> 0.001 
(0.970) 
-0.007 
(0.032) -0.006 0.011 -0.047 0.007 
Issuing size 
(p-value) 
> 0.001 
(0.906) 
> 0.001 
(0.799) 
< -0.001 
(0.318) 1500.546 1953.708 500 28139424 
Intersect 
(p-value) 
-0.002 
(0.006) 
< -0.001 
(0.744) 
-0.016 
(0.002)         
Number of 
obs. 691 604 87         
R^2 0.003 > 0.001 0.059         
Table 13  
In table 13, a regression in accordance to equation 4, is run on the two-day ACAR. The White-
test for constant variance in the residuals did not generate any significant results, meaning that 
the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity could not be rejected. Therefore, no adjustments for 
heteroscedasticity in the standard errors were needed in any of the samples. All samples 
generated excess kurtosis in the residuals aligned with regular financial data and rejected null 
hypothesis in the Jarque Bera-test, but normality was assumed to be able to perform the tests. 
This ACAR-measure was chosen, since it was the one that generated most significant returns and 
differences between the issuance types. The table says that neither CFNAI nor the size of the 
issuance seems to have any significant effect on the abnormal returns, except when tested on the 
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equity sample alone. Here there is a negative relation at a 0.05 significance level between the 
abnormal return and the change in CFNAI. (Suggesting smaller abnormal return losses in times 
of financial uncertainty and instability).  
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5.	Analysis	and	Discussion	
5.1	Similarity	Test	
The goal with the company similarity regression was to get as few significant variables as 
possible. This is since a significant coefficient for an independent variable would suggest that 
similarity between debt and equity issuing firms can be rejected in that specific variable. From 
the results, none of the value, leverage or size variables carried a significant coefficient, meaning 
that similarity between firms cannot be rejected. This increases the validity of the two sample 
comparison tests performed on the abnormal returns in connection to the event study. 
On the other hand, there was significance present in some of the industry dummy variables in the 
regression. The Consumer Staples dummy coefficient was negative and significant on a 0.01 
level meaning that the number of debt issues (or debt issuing firms) was significantly larger than 
the number of equity issuing firms in this industry. This makes sense, since the consumer staples 
industry is relatively stable with a constant demand, meaning that debt holders do not take a 
large amount of risk by investing in those kinds of firms. From a Pecking Order perspective, this 
would then mean that the companies in that kind of industry should choose to issue debt before 
equity, as long as debt can be issued relatively risk free. The Traditional Trade-off Theory 
suggests the same effect, since low risk firms should mean a lower probability of default and 
bankruptcy, while the tax shield effects stay constant. Therefore, a debt issuance makes more 
sense to increase leverage than an equity issuance in most companies in this stable industry. 
There was also significance present on the negative industry coefficient for the Information 
Technology sector on a 0.1 significance level. This does not make as much sense as in the 
Consumer Staples case, since Information Technology traditionally has been a more unstable 
industry. (An example of this instability would be the Dot-com bubble bursting in 2001.) What 
may affect the credibility positively for Information Technology firms in this study is that there 
are only large issuances included. This may mean that investors have higher confidence in large 
Information Technology firms (issuing large amounts of money) than for the industry overall, 
which would explain the surplus of debt issuing Information Technology firms. 
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5.2	Event	study	
5.2.1	General	Comment	
The event study returned both results that were expected, as well as a few surprises. In 
accordance with Myers and Majluf (1984), that was discussed earlier, the firms behaved 
according to the Pecking Order Theory under a certain assumption of low risk debt. This was 
present in both debt and equity issuances. The Traditional Trade-off Theory by Frank and Goyal 
(2007) had some similarities, with equity, and some divergences, with debt. 
5.2.2	Debt	
There are no significant results for any debt issuances, no matter how the hypothesis tests were 
conducted. All debt issuances had an ACAR that was not significantly different from 0. This 
means that the debt issuances have no effect on the actual return of the firm, and do not affect the 
stock price or value of the firm in any significant way, a textbook example of the Pecking Order 
Theory. This has large implications to managers and investors because information asymmetries 
are reduced when debt is issued. There are no ways for the managers to use their informational 
advantage to make the debt issuance work to their benefit. This is all in line with what Myers 
(1984) as well as Myers and Majluf (1984) discussed, where informational asymmetries lay at 
the heart of whether to choose debt or equity as a financing means. When debt is issued, there are 
several steps that the firm must go through in order to issue this debt, and much more 
information is available to investors. This leads to less adverse selection problems, since the 
informational asymmetries are reduced. Secondly, as was discussed by Jensen (1986), debt 
allows the debtholders to take the firm to bankruptcy if they default on their debt commitments, 
which is a very strong commitment from the firm. This further reduces problems that are caused 
by informational asymmetries leading to agency costs. 
From a Traditional Trade-off Theory perspective, the results are not making much sense. The 
debt issuance announcements do not affect the abnormal returns of stock prices positively. This 
is under the assumption that the value gained from the tax shield, on average, would outset the 
value of default probability as Ju et al. (2005) suggested, and that both the companies issuing 
debt and equity initially are below their optimal leverage ratio. There are two possible 
explanations for the insignificant results in this study. The first is that the value of probability of 
default and bankruptcy is actually larger than Ju et al. claim, and that it neutralizes the tax shield 
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gains much more than previous theory would suggest. The second explanation would be that 
those kinds of large companies already have strategies for tax planning, for instance offshore tax 
havens, so that an increase in debt financing does not really affect the tax shield value as much as 
expected. On the other hand, it can be seen that the companies issuing debt and the companies 
issuing equity do not have significantly different leverage ratios before the issuing 
announcement. This would, according to the Traditional Trade-off Theory, mean that a drop in 
abnormal returns after the issuing announcement would mean the opposite for debt issuing 
companies. The results from the event study combined with the insignificance in leverage ratios 
in the firm similarity test would therefore suggest that the static Traditional Trade-off Theory 
does not hold, assuming that debt issuing companies and equity issuing companies have same 
leverage ratio optima. 
When comparing the results of this study with the study of Eckbo (1986), it can be seen that the 
effects of debt issue announcements in the both studies are fairly similar for straight debt. This 
would, from a Pecking Order perspective, mean that there is a low amount of risk and 
information asymmetry in the debt issuances. It is interesting that the results are so similar, even 
though the samples are from rather different time periods. Eckbo’s sample was collected from 
1964-1981 and this study’s sample from 2007-2012. This means that an assumption can be made 
from a Pecking Order standpoint that the amount of information asymmetry and adverse 
selection for those kinds of straight debt issuing firms has not changed significantly over time. 
5.2.3	Equity	
Opposed to the bond issuances, equity issuances seem to have tumultuous and violent effects on 
ACAR. When an equity issuance is announced, there are statistically significant results in the 
changes in ACAR that are in-line with the Pecking Order Theory. When allowing the event to be 
averaged out over T+3 days, as in table 8, it can be seen that the event of the equity issuance is 
still persisting, even three days after the announcement. When isolating each day, from T to T+3, 
as can be seen in table 11, the event is only significant on the day T+1, which is the day after the 
announcement. This is surprising. Since the data is from closed to closed calculated stock 
returns, the expectation is that any effect that the event has will take place at date T. The only 
reason that is plausible for why the information takes so long to have an effect on the market is 
that firms issuing equity are announcing their equity issues after the close of the market. This 
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would mean that the effect will only be present the next day. It is plausible because it may make 
it easier to measure the effect for the issuing firm, since there will be no overlap of data and a 
reduction in noise on the firm valuation. There is unfortunately no way to find exactly what time 
the information is released, making it difficult to give a definitive answer for this time lag. 
Brown and Warner (1985) also give some insight into a possibility for this lag with their non-
synchronization problems. This may be a case where the markets either cannot or will not act 
when the event occurs. This is more unlikely, but it carries a small possibility.  
The reason that significant changes in the ACAR are viewed is because informational 
asymmetries are playing a huge role in the price investors are willing to pay for the equity that is 
being issued. As Myers (1984) discusses, the managers of the firm will use their superior 
knowledge about the firm to benefit themselves, especially since Leary and Roberts (2010) 
claim, compensation is tied to firm value. This means that equity is being issued, it is very likely 
because the equity is overvalued in the market, and will therefore benefit the manager in the 
short term. Potential investors know this, and will therefore adjust the price they are willing to 
pay for that equity, assuming that the manager will be working against them, therefore reducing 
the agency as well as adverse selection costs that come with asymmetric information.  
From a Traditional Trade-off Theory perspective, the equity issuances are behaving in line with 
the theory, assuming that the equity issuing companies on average are underlevered. As Fama 
and French (2002) and Welch (2007) state, the theories are not opposites, so just because the data 
is following one theory, it doesn't automatically mean that it will not follow the other. From this 
perspective, the firms are issuing equity in order to adjust their optimal leverage ratios. The act 
of issuing the equity is reducing the leverage ratio, bringing down the costs associated with 
bankruptcy, and reducing the relative size of the tax shield. The tax shield will decrease faster 
than the bankruptcy costs and therefore bring down the value of the firm, Ju et al (2005). This 
probably means that these firms are fairly close to maxing out their debt capacity, and they are 
turning to another form of financing.  
This leads to the assumption that equity issuances are more risky than debt issuances, and that 
the equity issuance also carries a higher cost than debt issuances do.  
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5.2.4	Combined	Analysis	
The results are also in line with what was discovered by Frank and Goyal (2003) and Myers 
(1986), where they found that larger firms, empirically, tend to behave according to the Pecking 
Order Theory, while theory suggests that smaller firms should display more of these 
characteristics. There was a $500 million issuance size restriction placed on the debt and equity 
issuances, which leads to the assumption that all firms in this study are large firms. 
All similarity tests returned results that were the same as the hypothesis tests. This means that the 
means were not statistically different from each other when there was no effect from the event. 
Conversely when there was an effect from the event, the means were statistically different from 
each other.  
The drop in the values of the ACAR of the equity and debt (not significantly) issuance 
announcements may also be due to instability in the macroeconomic environment. The data set is 
drawn from a period of macro financial distress that may be having a bigger effect on the results 
than the change in capital structure decisions. The results of the regression in 4.3 points against 
this since there were no positive significant coefficients.  
5.3	Effects	on	Abnormal	Returns	
The linear regression shows that issue size does not have a significant impact on the abnormal 
returns. This is in line with Eckbo’s (1986) and others studies, meaning that this factor does not 
affect the outcome of the comparison between abnormal returns for debt issue announcement 
versus equity issue announcements. Since the sample period is covering the financial crisis of 
2008, there was also an independent variable measuring the macroeconomic development in the 
US, added to see if the abnormal returns were affected more during times of macro financial 
distress. The variable used for measuring this is CFNAI. Surprisingly, this variable generated a 
negative coefficient, significant at 0.05, when the regression was run on the sample of firms 
abnormal returns that were announcing an equity issue. This would then suggest that the 
abnormal returns were less negative when issuing equity during the financial crisis than under 
times of economic growth. A Pecking Order perspective of this would mean that there is less 
information asymmetry present in times of national economic instability than usual. This could 
have to do with, for instance, increased levels of scrutinization and monitoring under times of 
financial distress. On the other hand, the coefficient is relatively small and the explanatory power 
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of the whole regression is rather small. This means that the significance in this case should be 
analyzed carefully. A further analysis of the reasons behind this negative relationship is outside 
the scope of this paper, but due to Jensen (1986) and Easterbrook’s (1984) work on signaling and 
monitoring effects, some basic assumptions can be made. 
The significance on CFNAI may be due to the time period that was chosen for the study. The 
data comes from a time when the global economy was in a financial crisis. This could lead to 
higher monitoring in the markets, due to financial uncertainty. Jensen (1986) and Easterbrook 
(1984) both discuss monitoring, and the effects that they have on asymmetric information. The 
increase in monitoring will lead to a reduction in information asymmetries, which would lead to 
a significant negative CFNAI coefficient.   
5.4	Potential	Flaws	in	the	Empirical	Setup	and	Results	
The event window in this study is a short-term window, with the maximum at four days, used 
over a short horizon. This avoids the problems that Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1998) 
encountered, and keeps results away from negative biases. This method of using short windows 
and short horizons can however lead to missing some market effects. It may be possible that 
events that occur fairly close to each other, but do not overlap, may have a larger effect on the 
changes in abnormal return that is not captured using the short-short data configuration.  
Another potential flaw with the event study is that the number of equity issuances is much 
smaller than the number debt issuances, meaning that the equity sample is more volatile to 
outliers or external factors that may affect the abnormal returns besides the issuing 
announcement. Therefore, a large drop in abnormal returns must be analyzed more carefully than 
in the debt issuing announcement sample. On the other hand, this will also increase the size of 
the standard errors in the equity issuance announcement sample meaning that a significant result 
from the t-test can be confidently used. 
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6.	Conclusion	and	Future	Research	
6.1	Conclusion	
To conclude, there is clearly a significant difference in the abnormal returns between firms that 
issue equity, and firms that issue debt. The results from this study present some very 
fundamental characteristics when considering external financing decisions. They are not as 
straight forwards as what the MM framework suggested them to be. Clearly, the results show 
that capital structure decisions do have an effect on firm value, and some financing decisions are 
clearly superior to others.  
The interplay between the Traditional Trade-off Theory put forth by Frank and Goyal (2007) and 
Pecking order theory by Myers and Majluf (1986) are clearly complex and subjective to each 
case's particular situation. While more evidence for the Pecking Order Theory is found in the 
empirical results, there are hints of the Traditional Trade-off Theory matching up as well when 
applying certain assumptions, further lending credit to observations made by Fama and French 
(2002) about the theories not being polar opposites.  
The findings help to explain how managers seem to make decisions when it comes to external 
financing and which form of financing to pursue, be it equity or debt. There is clearly a larger 
cost to equity financing, as the drop in company value associated with this type of financing 
decision is significant enough to observe an effect, making it more risky. Asymmetric 
information seems to be the cause of this cost, since high asymmetric information leads to 
agency and adverse selection costs, and potential investors try to mitigate the loss to themselves. 
Debt financing has no significant costs related to company value, and the effects seem to indicate 
that debt financing is relatively risk free in accordance with the Pecking Order Theory.  
This constant battle between managers and potential investors for information leads to these 
financing decisions and ultimately to the effects that these decisions have on firm value. The 
effects that stem from theses debt vs equity financing decisions seem to follow the Pecking 
Order Theory most closely opposed to the Traditional Trade-off Theory. 
6.2	Future	Research	
Further studies may include some extra instruments, instead of just debt and equity. Firstly, 
convertible bonds, as was included by Eckbo (1986), would be interesting to compare side by 
39	
	
side with debt and equity. This may give some more in-depth detail about each individual firm, 
since the instrument has both debt and equity components. It would also be possible to make 
some conclusions about the investors’ views of the probability for other investors to convert their 
share of convertible debt into equity. This is under the assumption that the convertible bonds can 
be considered to carry risk somewhere in between the risk of equity and the risk of debt. That 
would then, according to the Pecking Order Theory mean that the drop in abnormal return should 
be somewhere in between the ACAR of debt and equity issuance announcements.  
Secondly, a comprehensive comparative study of internal cash to debt issues could also provide 
further insights into the Pecking Order Theory. The expectation is that cash will have no adverse 
effects on value, but our research shows that debt issues also have no significant effect on the 
value (ACAR).  
Thirdly, using different market models to estimate the alphas and betas could be used to see 
whether there is any significant difference when calculating abnormal returns to the model used 
in this study. Finally, different data may give an insight into the lag in the market reacting to the 
information. Open to open, or open to closed data may give a different perspective on this lag, 
and a comparison may yield different results.  
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